The Port of Granville and the North American Fisheries in the 18th Century by Briére, Jean-François
RESEARCH NOTE 
The Port of Granville 
and the North American Fisheries 
in the 18th Century 
T H E PORT OF GRANVILLE, on the western coast of the Cotentin in lower 
Normandy, is little known by historians. Maritime historiography of Ancien 
Regime France has concentrated mainly on the study of major ports involved in 
the circuit of tropical commerce: Saint-Malo, Nantes, Le Havre, La Rochelle, 
Bordeaux, Marseilles, etc. Researchers have shown little interest in less impor-
tant ports, especially when — as was the case for Granville — their main activity 
was fishing off Newfoundland. In addition research on Granville involved 
another handicap: the civil archives of the département de la Manche were 
destroyed during the Battle of Normandy in 1944. As a result, it has become 
rather difficult to carry out detailed research on the history of Granville. Luck-
ily, there is one major exception to the general lack of information: Granville's 
ships' outfitting rolls (roles d'armement) have been preserved intact in the local 
Marine archives.1 With these sources, recorded by the marine administration, a 
serial analysis of sea trade for the port of Granville can be carried out. A close 
study of these records reveals that Granville was one of the most dynamic 
French ports in the 18th century while being almost completely specialized in 
high seas fishing.2 
Granville's outfitting for cod fishing in North America goes back at least to 
the mid-16th century, when it is mentioned in a charter dated 1564.3 Data is 
sparse for the 17th century. A study by Nicolas Langlois shows that 20 ships 
were outfitted for Newfoundland in 1627. 24 ships were listed in the 1664 inven-
tory of the French fleet and Montmort's survey in 1687 indicates that there were 
1 These documents are kept at the Archives Municipales in Granville. 
2 The following studies have been published on Granville in the 18th century: J. Darsel, "Le Port 
de Granville au XVille siècle: trafic maritime, pêche, guerre de course", Revue de l'Avranchin 
et du Pays de Granville, a. 85, t. 44, no. 250 (1967), pp. 1-19; R. Kaninda, "Les Relations com-
merciales entre Granville et Marseille au XVIIIe siècle (1709-1792)", M.A. thesis, Aix-en-
Provence, 1969; C. de la Morandière, "Les Déboires d'un capitaine morutier de Granville à 
Terre-Neuve, 1769", Revue du Département de la M anche, t. 14, fasc. 53(1972), pp. 62-71; C. de 
la Morandière, "Le Port de Granville des origines à nos jours", Etudes Normandes, no. 50 
(1955), pp. 245-64; C. de la Morandière, Histoire de Granville (Paris, 1966). On the trade out of 
St. Malo, see Jean-Francois Brière, "Le trafic terre-neuvier malouin dans la première moitié du 
XVIIIe siècle, 1713-1755", Histoire sociale/Social History, No. 22 (Novembre 1978), pp. 
356-74". On the market for cod in 18th century France, see Laurier Turgeon, "Les structures de 
la consommation de la morue en France au XVIIIe siècle", Historical Papers/Communications 
historiques (1984), pp. 21-41. 
3 J. Darsel, "Le Port de Granville au XVIIIe siècle", p. 3. 
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25.4 Saint-Malo was then by far the leading French port outfitting for the New-
foundland fisheries: by the end of the 17th century, it was sending close to 100 
ships a year to this destination. 
In 1722, the first year for which outfitting rolls are available, Granville sent 
only 32 ships with 922 men aboard to the North American fisheries. By the end 
of the century, however, it was sending every year close to 100 ships carrying be-
tween 3,000 and 4,000 men: more than a threefold increase in 75 years. During 
those years, the port became far too small to accommodate all of its ships and a 
new jetty had to be constructed starting in 1750. An examination of the outfit-
ting rolls (Table One) shows that from 1722 to 1792, the port of Granville out-
fitted 4,027 ships totalling 389,822 tons for the North American fishing 
grounds.5 The figures for the period 1713 to 1721 are not known. The number of 
ships for the years 1760 and 1762 — war years with no or very few ships out-
fitted — are also not available. 
From 1722 to the War of the Austrian Succession, the number of ships out-
fitted each year increased nearly threefold, from 32 to 91 in 1743. Post-war re-
covery was rapid with outfitting soon reaching a high yearly ceiling of 90-95 
ships between 1751 and 1755. But recovery was only partial after 1763 with fish-
ing expeditions levelling off at approximately 80 ships per year between 1766 
and 1772. Outfitting did not return to levels common in the 1750s until 
1774-1776. Recovery was speedy but shortlived after the American Revolu-
tionary War, since the number of expeditions began to drop again from 99 
ships in 1787 to 74 in 1792. Remarkably high levels were reached in 1743 and 
1776 (a record for the century: 106 ships), both years which immediately pre-
ceded the outbreak of war. 
The variations of the average tonnage per ship are sizable. After a sharp drop 
from 1722 to 1726 (65 tons), the average tonnage nearly doubled to 124 tons in 
1754. In 1755, a long downward trend began and continued until the American 
Revolutionary War (86 tons in 1777). After the war, the average tonnage 
increased again, but not as much as in the first half of the century; it did, how-
ever, exhibit a tendency to move downwards after 1787. 
From 1722 to 1792, Granville sent a total of 135,212 men to the Newfound-
land fisheries.6 This averages out to a little over five men per day over a period of 
71 years. Between 1722 and 1730, the figures remained at about 1,000 men per 
year. Then numbers began to climb drastically between 1731 and 1754: the 
Newfoundland-bound fishermen quadrupled to nearly 4,000 men per year. 
Numbers levelled off at this high point (between 3,000 and 4,000 men), dropping 
4 Bibliothèque Nationale, manuscrits français 18596, fo. 17; C. de la Morandière, Histoire de la 
pêche française de la morue dans l'Amérique septentrionale (Paris, 1962), t. 1, p. 289. 
5 The destination of one ship is missing in 1754. This ship therefore does not appear in regional 
shipping figures. 
6 The destination of a 41-man crew (a number excluding green cod fishing) is missing in 1754. 
Therefore it does not appear in regional figures. 
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exceptionally in 1768 and 1771, up to 1786 which had the highest level for the 
century (4,076 men). Lastly, a sharp drop of about one-third occurred from 1787 
to 1792. These figures are enormous when compared to the number of inhabi-
tants in Granville: they mean that in the best of times, Granville was able to send 
across the Atlantic each year a number of men equal to nearly half its total pop-
ulation of 8 or 9,000. The explanation lies in the fact that a significant percen-
tage of the crews actually came from rural areas of western Cotentin, not from 
Granville. 
In order to understand the overall development of the trends outlined above, it 
is necessary to grasp the internal workings of the fishing industry. This industry 
was divided into several geographic zones, each carrying on activities having dif-
ferent technical characteristics. As is well known, two major types of fishing 
were practiced at Newfoundland in the 18th century. The first type, green cod 
fishing or mobile fishing (pêche errante) was carried out with small ships called 
bankers (banquais) in the fishing banks off the Newfoundland coast at a dis-
tance of 30 to 150 miles from shore. The fish was simply salted on board the 
ships which had left France in March or April. They would return in September 
or October without ever having landed or sometimes without even seeing land, a 
very unique situation in transatlantic sailing. The second type, dry cod fishing, 
also called sedentary fishing (pêche sédentaire) was carried out in land-based 
long-boats along the coasts of Newfoundland and North America. Cod was 
salted and dried on shore; thus ships were not used for fishing but rather to tran-
sport crews which could be quite sizable (more than 150 men) since they worked 
partly on land. 
From 1722 to 1792, 2,344 Granville ships were engaged in mobile fishing at 
the Banks (58 per cent of all ships bound for the Newfoundland fisheries). Un-
like Saint-Malo, Granville had traditionally been engaged in green cod fishing. 
The number of bankers rose from 24 in 1722 to 52 in 1739 and remained stable 
at a high level until 1755. Recovery seems to have been very difficult after the 
Seven Years' War; pre-war levels were not matched until 1775. The record level 
for the century was set in 1776 with 63 bankers. After that year, outfitting 
declined, particularly after 1787. 
From 1722 to 1792, 35,559 men or 26 per cent of Granville's crews sent to the 
North American fisheries were engaged in mobile fishing. Though the majority 
of the ships involved in transatlantic fishing were bankers, the vast majority of 
men (74 per cent) worked in sedentary fishing. The number of men sent to the 
Banks doubled between 1722 and 1750-53 (from 437 to 930 per year) and then 
showed a definite decrease linked to a decline in crew density on board. 
Granville outfitted 1,114 ships (28 per cent of all ships sent to the North 
American fisheries) for the coast of Newfoundland between 1722 and 1792. 
Until 1736, sedentary fishing remained relatively unimportant and concentrated 
almost exclusively on the Gaspé peninsula and Labrador. Only four sedentary 
fishing ships out of 152 reached Newfoundland during this period. Granville 
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Table One 
Granville Outfitting to the North American Fishing Grounds 
(all destinations) 
years 
1722 
1723 
1724 
1725 
1726 
1727 
1728 
1729 
1730 
1731 
1732 
1733 
1734 
1735 
1736 
1737 
1738 
1739 
1740 
1741 
1742 
1743 
1744 
1745 
1746 
1747 
1748 
1749 
1750 
1751 
1752 
1753 
1754 
1755 
1756 
1757 
number of ships 
32 
40 
53 
54 
43 
46 
48 
47 
46 
51 
59 
61 
50 
63 
66 
71 
67 
77 
70 
74 
76 
91 
67 
4 
2' 
3 
11 
66 
85 
95 
93 
91 
93 
94 
1 
1 
average tonnage/ship 
97.5 
85.7 
75.9 
75.3 
65.3 
71.8 
74 
70.1 
71.4 
72.1 
73.1 
75 
75 
73.9 
78.9 
79.2 
79.2 
80.8 
83.2 
86.7 
88.5 
92 
82.9 
121.2 
90 
120 
90 
105.9 
108.3 
119 
120.7 
116.2 
124.2 
118 
60 
200 
number of 
922 
967 
1,106 
1,170 
818 
1,034 
1,121 
1,053 
1,022 
1,132 
1,368 
1,301 
1,137 
1,412 
1,611 
1,969 
1,700 
2,068 
2,054 
2,352 
2,665 
3,295 
2,020 
277 
45 
112 
217 
2,449 
3,083 
3,416 
3,676 
3,476 
3,987 
3,593 
12 
91 
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1758 
1759 
1760 
1761 
1762 
1763 
1764 
1765 
1766 
1767 
1768 
1769 
1770 
1771 
1772 
1773 
1774 
1775 
1776 
1777 
1778 
1779 
1780 
1781 
1782 
1783 
1784 
1785 
1786 
1787 
1788 
1789 
1790 
1791 
1792 
1 
0 
? 
0 
? 
36 
57 
65 
79 
82 
79 
79 
82 
69 
83 
87 
89 
96 
106 
86 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
61 
86 
91 
97 
99 
95 
89 
84 
82 
74 
80 
-
? 
-
7 
109.8 
116.9 
110.7 
112.5 
106.5 
98.8 
100 
96.6 
92.9 
98.5 
99.5 
99.1 
93.9 
94.3 
85.8 
166 
-
-
-
-
104.2 
106.5 
108.2 
112.6 
111.6 
104.9 
102.4 
104.9 
101.4 
101.1 
37 
0 
? 
0 
? 
1,206 
2,367 
2,880 
3,452 
3,376 
3,030 
3,151 
3,284 
2,463 
3,344 
3,256 
3,527 
3,461 
3,617 
2,448 
24 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2,185 
2,948 
3,319 
4,076 
3,669 
3,440 
2,880 
2,844 
2,767 
2,466 
Source: Archives Municipales Granville, série C 6, 141 to 178 (armements 1722-1759), C 6, 179 to 
212 and 12 P, 1 to 23 (désarmements 1726 to 1793). 
fishermen were not to come to the island's shores until 1737. The number of 
ships increased rapidly from three in 1737 to 19 in 1743 and 43 in 1769. Out-
fitting then reached a plateau approaching 40 vessels per year until the end of the 
century. This represents a steady increase which after 1763 was due essentially 
to the closing of the Canadian coast to French fishing. The sedentary fishing 
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fleet as a whole did not grow between the 1750s and the 1760s. 
The portion of the tonnage outfitted for the coast of Newfoundland was 41 per 
cent for the century, a much higher figure than the number of ships outfitted for 
that destination would suggest. This is because the average tonnage per ship (144 
tons) was twice that of bankers. But the average tonnage per man on board was 
very low: only two tons between 1722 and 1792 whereas it was close to 5 tons on 
bankers. Thus the average space per man on a ship engaged in sedentary fishing 
was twice as small as that available on a banker. Contrary to what one might 
have expected, men were most crowded on the larger ships, not on the smaller 
ones. This apparent anomaly is, of course, due to differences in fishing tech-
niques. The banker was an actual fishing vessel whose crew could not exceed the 
number of men able to fish from a single side of the ship; the sedentary fishing 
vessel, however, serving only to transport manpower, could take on board 
virtually as many men as the ship could hold. 
From 1722 to 1758, Granville also sent 202 sedentary fishing vessels to 
Labrador (10 per cent of the ships outfitted for the North American fisheries 
during that period). Until 1733, outfitting for Labrador was quite insignificant: 
five ships or less per year. Then, from 1734 to 1755, it increased to the range of 
five to 14 ships, apparently because bad fishing and clashes with local settlers 
had provoked a retreat of expeditions at Gaspé. Granville sent 12,718 men to 
Labrador between 1722 and 1758 (22 per cent of the total number of men sent to 
the fisheries during the same period). The number of men sent to Labrador 
climbed to a record 901 men in 1743. Of all the fisheries-bound vessels, those 
outfitted for Labrador had by far the highest crew density on board: less than 
two tons per man between 1729 and 1744. Such extremely low figures point to 
an exceptionally high crowding on these ships, similar to what was common 
practice on privateers. 
Granville sent 231 fishing ships to Gaspé from 1722 to 1755 (11.6 per cent of 
the vessels sent to the North American fisheries during that period). After a few 
poor years, the pace of outfitting for Gaspé suddenly picked up in 1725 with an 
increase from two to nine vessels. Activity then levelled off at this point until 
1733. This was followed by a drop which apparently benefitted Labrador, but 
this was only temporary and shipping returned to pre-crisis levels in 1740 (11 
ships) and 1741 (12 ships). Shipping began to drop again in 1742 and there were 
only two ships in 1744. After the War of the Austrian Succession, outfitting for 
Gaspé returned to the levels of its best pre-war years (12 vessels in 1749) and, 
despite a temporary drop, reached a record level of 14 ships in 1754 and 1755. 
Granville sent 10,349 men to Gaspé between 1722 and 1755 (17.3 per cent of the 
total number of men sent to the fisheries during the same period). Fluctuations 
follow the number of ships outfitted: there was a sharp rise in 1725 (from 122 to 
377 men); the level held steady through 1732 (more than 300 men per year), 
dropped in 1733-1734 (147 men), rose again between 1735 and 1743 (470 men) 
and then declined sharply just before the war. There was a considerable increase 
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in 1749 (725 men), followed by a drop (300-400 men) and then by a further 
increase in 1754 (a record 756 men) and 1755. 
Granville sent 48 vessels to Ile Royale between 1722 and 1755, and 87 to 
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon from 1763 to 1792 (a total of only 3.3 per cent of ships 
outfitted for the North American fisheries). For various reasons, Granville was 
unable to sustain a full scale commodity trade with the colonies, thus its 
armateurs were not interested in this particular area. Strangely enough, the 
average number of men per ton on ships outfitted for Ile Royale was much 
higher than on those bound for Sainte-Pierre-et-Miquelon. In all likelihood, 
fishing, which still played an important role in outfitting for Ile Royale, declined 
at Saint-Pierre because the inhabitants had monopolized drying space on shore 
and trading cod with them eliminated the need for large crews. 
The system of remuneration of Newfoundland-bound crews in use at Gran-
ville in the 18th century was the "engagement au cinquième", which was codi-
fied by the statutes of 25 May 1743.7 In such a system, each man signed on re-
ceived a sum of money called the "pot de vin" several weeks before departure. 
The amount of the "pot de vin" fluctuated according to the availability of 
labour, each man's qualifications and the outfitters' financial situation. Around 
1750, a captain was paid from 250 to 400 livres as "pot de vin", a sailor from 80 
to 200 livres and a ship's boy from 20 to 40 livres. Men who were particularly 
sought after for their expertise were paid an additional sum called the "denier à 
Dieu". These sums became irrevocably the crewmen's property as soon as the 
ship set out to sea. 
At the end of the expedition, the crew received one-fifth of the net proceeds 
from the sale of the cargo. This figure was obtained by subtracting from the 
gross amount of the sale, expenses jointly incurred by outfitter and crew 
(Admiralty fees, damage losses, warehousing costs, broker's fees, etc.), return 
expenses for those men returning by sackships, as well as the amount of the 
"pratiques" (bonuses) paid to the officers and the captain's "chapeau" (special 
bonus)8. If the ship unloaded in a Mediterranean port, the captain received an 
extra bonus called the "chapeau du Détroit" when he passed Gibraltar. Unlike 
the "pratiques", the amounts of the "chapeaux", set beforehand, were paid in 
7 Archives Nationales Colonies, C 11 F 5, fo. 140, "Règlement pour la pêche à Terre-Neuve", 
Granville, 25 mai 1743. For a general description of the "engagement au cinquième", 
see Archives Nationales Marine, C 5, 59, "Mémoire sur les différentes formes d'engagements en 
usage dans les ports de Granville et de Saint-Malo pour les équipages qui font la pêche de 
la morue à la cote de l'isle de Terre-Neuve", by Mauduit, Granville, 8 janvier 1788; Archives de 
la Marine, Brest, PB 2, 9e, "Engagemens des équipages des vaisseaux armés à Saint-Malo 
pour la pesche de la morue", anonymous note, 1773; see also Archives Municipales Granville, C 
6, 202 to 212 and 12 P, 1 to 23 (roles désarmement Granville). 
8 Sack-ships (saques) were ships which came back directly from Newfoundland to their home port 
in France and took on board part of the crews of ships going to the Mediterranean. The 
role of English sack-ships was quite different: they traded foodstuffs and manufactured goods 
with Newfoundland's settlers. 
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their entirety without regard to the outcome of the expedition. The "pratiques" 
paid to the captain in the case of a maximum catch ("pêche entière") were the 
basic unit from which all the other "pratiques" had to be calculated. At Gran-
ville an expedition was considered to have brought its maximum return when the 
total catch averaged 1,200 green cod or 40 quintals of dry cod per man (200 
quintals per longboat). In this case, the captain's "pratiques" amounted to 26 
handfuls ("poignées") of green cod ( 52 cod) or five quintals of dry cod, plus a 
barrel of cod-oil. Using this as a base, the 'pratiques" paid out varied both 
according to rank and to the outcome of the expedition. The first officer and the 
surgeon generally received "pratiques entières" (full bonuses) as did the captain. 
The lieutenant and midshipmen received only one-half or one-third of the 
"pratiques". But if the expedition had resulted in one-half, one-third, or one-
quarter catch, the outfitter decreased the "pratiques" accordingly to one-half, 
one-third or one-quarter of what was normally due. Outfitters were free to offer 
higher "pratiques" than those specified in the 1743 statutes, but in this case the 
extra amount was not taken from the gross product but from the outfitter's four-
fifths. 
The amount obtained after deductions, the net product, was divided by five; 
the result (the "cinquième") was then divided into a certain number of equal 
shares. To calculate the value of a share, the "cinquième" was divided by the 
number of men on board plus one, since the captain always counted for two. The 
formula used was as follows: 
gross product — (expenses + "pratiques" + "chapeaux") 
5 
(number of men + 1) 
Once the value of a share had been established, there were further complica-
tions. Only seamen able to serve in the navy ("matelots classés") received a full 
share. Ships' green men ("novices") and ships' boys ("mousses") were paid only 
a fraction of the share (one-half, one-third, one-fourth), sometimes receiving 
nothing at all on their first trip. On the other hand, most of the officers were 
paid more than one share. Because of this uneven distribution, the entire number 
of shares allotted to the crew was not always paid out. This situation arose 
whenever there were enough ships' green men and boys on board to bring the 
total fractions of shares deducted from their pay above the total fraction of 
shares added to the officers' remuneration. In such a case, the extra shares or 
parts of shares not allotted, called "lots-bons", were kept by the outfitter. The 
outfitter could thus recover 12 or 15 shares from a large crew. One-fifth of the 
price of the return freight taken after the unloading of cod was also distributed 
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to members of the crew: the captain received a fixed sum called the "chapeau du 
fret" taken from the gross figure of the amount. One-fifth of the remaining sum 
was divided into shares as had been done for the catch. 
By reversing the procedure used by the outfitters to calculate the shares, the 
total net value of the cargo can be found. One need only know the value of the 
share and the number of men in each crew. Once these two figures have been 
determined for each ship, the net annual value of Granville cod fishing can be 
calculated by using the following formula: 
average share x average number of x 5 = average net x number of = total 
per ship men per ship + 1 value per ships net 
cargo annual 
value of 
Granville 
fishing 
The results obtained are shown in Table Two. From 1722 to 1792, the total net 
value of Granville fishing in North America rose to at least 86 million livres. 
Given the lack of data for 15 years and the missing expenses and bonuses for all 
years, it can be reasonably estimated that the gross value of Granville cod-
fishing in North America during the period must have reached 100 million 
livres. 
Table Two 
Net Value of Granville Fishing in North America 
year 
1726 
1727 
1728 
1729 
1730 
1731 
1732 
1733 
1734 
1735 
1736 
1737 
1738 
average net value 
per cargo (livres) 
8,300 
9,243 
11,178 
11,466 
12,876 
14,206 
12,893 
10,592 
14,575 
12,870 
12,573 
14,637 
14,202 
total net value of Granville 
fishing (livres) 
356,900 
425,178 
536,544 
538,902 
592,296 
724,506 
760,687 
646,112 
728,750 
810,810 
829,818 
1,039,227 
951,534 
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1739 
1740 
1741 
1742 
1743 
1744 
1745 
1746 
1747 
1748 
1749 
1750 
1751 
1752 
1753 
1754 
1755 
1756 
1757 
1758 
1759 
1760 
1761 
1762 
1763 
1764 
1765 
1766 
1767 
1768 
1769 
1770 
1771 
1772 
1773 
1774 
1775 
1776 
1777 
1778 
1779 
1780 
1781 
15,846 
18,483 
22,726 
19,620 
18,786 
-
-
-
-
-
27,241 
21,204 
20,110 
23,085 
20,723 
21,485 
21,168 
-
100,740 
-
-
-
-
-
23,287 
26,987 
27,859 
20,293 
21,260 
21,615 
27,132 
31,262 
24,522 
24,720 
23,232 
30,450 
29,415 
24,570 
25,725 
-
-
-
1,220,142 
1,293,810 
1,681,724 
1,491,120 
1,709,526 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
1,797,906 
1,802,340 
1,910,450 
2,146,905 
1,885,793 
1,998,105 
1,989,792 
_ 
100,740 
. 
. 
_ 
_ 
_ 
838,332 
1,538,259 
1,810,835 
1,603,147 
1,743,320 
1,707,585 
2,143,428 
2,563,484 
1,692,018 
2,051,760 
2,021,184 
2,710,050 
2,823,840 
2,604,420 
2,212,350 
. 
_ 
_ 
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1782 
1783 
1784 
1785 
1786 
1787 
1788 
1789 
1790 
1791 
1792 
-
40,480 
34,496 
33,099 
33,110 
26,790 
24,180 
21,811 
24,186 
27,933 
39,959 
total : 
-
2,469,280 
2,966,656 
3,012,009 
3,211,670 
2,652,210 
2,297,100 
1,941,179 
2,031,624 
2,290,506 
2,956,966 
85,862,829 
Source: Archives Municipales Granville, série C 6, 141 to 178 (armements 1722-1759), C 6, 179 to 
212 and 12 P, 1 to 23 (désarmements 1726 to 1793). 
Table Three 
Average net value of cargoes by destination 
(livres) 
Destin- Newfoundland Ile Royale 
ation: Banks coast Labrador Gaspé StPierre-M 
1726-1755 10,458 27,032 30,278 20,156 11,225 (IR) 
1763-1792 11,678 42,901 - - 9,131 (SPM) 
In summary, the development of Granville's North American fishing-trade 
during the 18th century can be broken down chronologically into five very dis-
tinct periods: 
(1) Up to 1750: a long period of expansion suddenly gaining momentum after 
1737, in conjunction with a boom in sedentary fishing, especially along the coast 
of Newfoundland. This move towards Newfoundland followed a general trend 
of the French fishing fleet in the 1730s. Lack of adequate drying space and com-
petition from local settlers appear to have caused such a geographical shift.9 
(2) From 1751 to 1768: a period of levelling off, followed by stagnation and re-
9 J.F. Brière, "Pêche et politique à Terre-Neuve au XVIIIe siècle: la France véritable gagnante du 
traité d'Utrecht?", Canadian Historical Review, LXIV, 2 (juin 1983), p. 173. 
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cession. Granville's fishing-industry seems to have reached its maximum limits 
between 1751 and 1755. A specific type of expansion, relying upon material 
factors such as larger ships and crews, had reached its peak. Following 1763, the 
after-effects of the war, which had been quite disastrous for Granville, generated 
a recession, ushering in a period of diminished activity. It is interesting to note at 
this point that most of the clashes between British and French fishermen at 
Newfoundland in the 1760s were actually clashes between the British and the 
Granvillais. The Granvillais were trying to gain ground in the eastern part of the 
French Shore where the French had never been before and where thousands of 
British fishermen had settled. 
(3) From 1769 to 1786: a second period of expansion, not as steady or linked to 
physical growth and more distinctly commercial than that of the 1740s. The size 
of ships and crews was decreased in order to lower costs. Outfitters limited their 
expenditures, trying to increase profit through higher prices rather than higher 
quantities. The extraordinarily good years following the American Revolu-
tionary War triggered feverish activity which culminated in 1786. 
(4) From 1787 to 1789: a short but brutal crisis occurred. This slump hit the 
French cod-fishing industry as a whole, not just Granville's trade. The booming 
of the cod market after the war generated overinvestment in the fishing industry, 
creating an over supply, while demand fell as a consequence of the economic 
crisis of the pre-Revolution years. 
(5) From 1790 to 1792: signs of recovery were noted, but soon faded as prospects 
of a new war arose. 
Above and beyond these fluctuations, one essential fact of major importance 
remains: the extraordinary rise of the Granville fishing industry was unique 
among ports outfitting for the fisheries. What made Granville able to challenge 
Saint-Malo as the top French port outfitting for the North American fisheries? 
Four key factors seem to have played a decisive role in allowing such a remark-
able expansion. 
The Gabelles ordinance of 1689 required that Granville's ships bound for the 
North American fisheries load their salt at Brouage (Vendée) just before cross-
ing the Atlantic.10 Although salt for the fisheries was exempted from taxation, 
the Fermiers Généraux had always been opposed to their collecting salt in near-
by Brittany (a province exempted from the royal salt tax) for fear that they 
might smuggle this salt into Normandy. Such an obligation prevented the Gran-
villais from outfitting for dry cod fishing since the delay caused by loading salt 
at Brouage or nearby Ré island made them reach (and leave) the coast of New-
foundland much later than their competitors from Brittany. The few vessels 
10 Ordonnance des Gabelles, title XV, art. 1 and 2. 
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which took their dry cod to the Mediterranean used to return to Granville in 
February or March and had to leave for Newfoundland again no later than 
April; not having enough time to sail to Brouage, their captains sometimes 
illegally loaded their salt at Saint-Malo. Granville's armateurs succeeded in 
obtaining a decisive loosening of these restrictions in January 1739: sedentary 
fishing vessels of more than 80 tons (less likely to be used for smuggling than 
smaller ships) were authorized to load their salt in Brittany.11 At this very 
moment, the Anglo-Spanish war (1739) sharply reduced the supply of English 
dry cod in Spain, inviting the Granvillais and the Malouins to fill the deficit. 
Thus stimulated and freed from any hindrance, Granville outfitting for dry cod 
fishing took off rapidly. Cargoes of cod brought to Marseilles (the major French 
market for dry cod) by Granville's vessels fluctuated between 5,000 and 15,000 
quintals per year until 1735; they reached a total of 60,000 quintals in 1752 and 
95,000 quintals in 1786.12. 
Although the link from cause to effect is less clear, it appears that the 
"engagement au cinquième" may also have played a role in the expansion of 
Granville's fishing-industry. Of the many systems used by French outfitters to 
remunerate crews engaged in cod-fishing, the "engagement au cinquième" was 
the one which, by far, offered the best apportionment between the "pot de vin" 
and the shares. By avoiding to give crew members either very large "pots de vin" 
and very small shares (as in Saint-Malo) or no "pot de vin" at all and only 
shares (as in the Basque ports), the "au cinquième" struck a balance between 
two conflicting needs: attracting men by offering guaranteed remuneration and 
stimulating productivity. A greater efficiency resulted since the "pot de vin" 
prevented men from being too easily discouraged from enlisting after a series of 
bad fishing seasons had threatened their income. The share, which was based on 
the commercial value of the catch (not the case in Saint-Malo) was sizable 
enough to discourage a lowering of the productive effort. 
There is also little doubt that Granville gained from the decline of the cod 
fishing-industry in many French ports where it had been active and prosperous 
in the 16th and 17th centuries. Some of these ports lost ground during the 18th 
century (Dieppe, Saint-Valéry-en-Caux, Honfleur, Le Croisic, Les Sables 
d'Olonne, La Rochelle, Bayonne, Saint-Jean-de-Luz). Others, on the contrary 
(Le Havre, Nantes, Bordeaux), developed enormously, but the profits from 
tropical colonial trade induced their outfitters to give up cod fishing. Such a 
phenomenon caused outfitting for the fisheries to be increasingly concentrated 
in three specialized ports on the English Channel (Saint-Malo, Granville, Saint-
Brieuc) which eventually formed a sort of cod fishing oligopoly outfitting about 
70 per cent of the French fishing fleet bound for North America in the 1780s. 
11 Archives Départementales Loire-Atlantique, C 744, 8, decree in Council, 13 January 1739. 
12 R. Kaninda, "Les Relations commerciales entre Granville et Marseille au XVIIIe siècle", M.A. 
thesis, Aix-en-Provence, 1969, annexes. 
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ships (1683) 
(372)* 
(70)* 
77 
34 
22 
7 
79 
20 
ships (1786) 
386 
1 
18 
26 
0 
36 
120 
105 
Table Four 
Ships Outfitted for the North American Fisheries 
Ports 
France (total) 
Le Havre 
Les Sables 
Honfleur 
Pornic 
Saint-Brieuc 
Saint-Malo 
Granville 
•Numbers with brackets are estimates given by R. Richard. 
Source: R. Richard, "Comptes et profits de navires terre-neuviers au Havre au XVIIe siècle", Revue 
d'Histoire Economique et Sociale, vol. 54, no. 4 (1976), pp. 476-524. 
The expansion of Granville's cod fishing industry was also, paradoxically, the 
consequence of a failure, that of a colonial ambition. In order to develop a com-
modity trade with the West Indies, Granville's outfitters attempted in 1737 to 
have their city added to the list of ports (Saint-Malo was one of them) which en-
joyed the right to trade with French colonies. Controller General Orry, who was 
unwilling to pay for the creation of a Bureau des Fermes in Granville and feared 
that he would create a precedent that might be used by other fishing ports, flatly 
denied their request: "Cod fishing being the peaceful activity of Granville's out-
fitters they can lock themselves in it and enjoy the privileges attached to the 
French cod fishing-industry...without it being necessary to grant them the privi-
leges of colonial trade".13 
Much later, after the Seven Years War, the Granvillais were given the right to 
trade with the colonies, but their colonial trade always remained extremely 
limited. The Granville harbour was too small, unsafe and unfit for accomodat-
ing all the loading and warehousing facilities required for extensive trade with 
the colonies. Until the end of the century, it did not even have a quay. The very 
few Granville armateurs who turned to colonial trade simply moved their busi-
ness to nearby Saint-Malo. 
13 Archives Nationales Marine, B3, 383, fo. 52, Orry to Maurepas, 24 May 1737. 
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This "locking up" in cod fishing was a most important factor in the striking 
expansion of Granville's fishing industry. It prevented outfitters (and investors) 
from dispersing their efforts and forced them to funnel their financial, technical 
and human resources into one single area of sea trade. The reinvestment of 
profits from cod fishing into cod fishing was thus promoted, maintaining in this 
narrow sector a process of cumulative development which did not exist to the 
same degree in other ports outfitting for the North American fisheries. 
JEAN-FRANÇOIS BRIÈRE 
